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INTRODUCTION 
The structural development of repressive laws in authoritarian states is seldom studied. Instead, 
the academic discourse focusses largely on measures rather than laws and relates these to 
agency-centred perspectives and models of rational-choice, see the extensive literature-reviews 
of deMerrit (2017) and Davenport and Inman (2012). Such studies imply, that designed or 
applied repressive measures and laws are event-specific and aim at utility maximation. Meaning, 
that they are in a clear relation to specific features of the threat that is repressed and follow the 
cost-benefit considerations of agents1. For example, Varol (2015) analyses how authoritarians 
and their functionaries designed and rationally used (i.e. after event-specific cost-benefit 
considerations) repressive laws in order to suppress conceived threats to the government’s 
power. 
Yet, rational-choice theories have often been criticized to underestimate the influence of 
possibly irrational factors like feelings, habits, traditions, convictions and believes (Fioretos 
2016, 5). Structural theories like Historical Institutionalism take these factors into account. 
Historical institutionalism is used to analyse the structural development of governmental 
institutions through time (e.g. electoral institutions). Some of these analyses thereby focus on 
authoritarian regimes (Gerschewski 2013, 17; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). A 
few studies thereby specifically focus on repressive legal institutions, like repressive laws. They 
analyse a phenomenon of institutional development that is called path dependence (Asal and 
Summer 2016; Pereira 2005). 
Concerning the law, path-dependence describes the phenomenon that an initially adopted 
legal provision becomes locked-in in a developmental trajectory which reinforces itself 
continuously, becoming progressively more immune to change (Mahoney 2000, 511-513). 
Hence, path dependency impedes the adoption of new legal provisions that are alternative from 
already existing legal provisions, thereby limiting rational-choice. Moreover, path dependence 
might be maintained by irrational decisions-making. For example, by decisions-making that is 
merely based on old habits. 
 To further research the influence of path dependence on repressive legislation in 
authoritarian regimes, I take Kazakhstan as a case-study. Kazakhstan represents favourable 
circumstances for this kind of research because it is a consolidated authoritarian regime 
(Freedom House 2011-2016) that recently introduced a new set of amendments regarding 
migration, freedom of religion, communication and circulation of weapons that increased 
restrictions on human rights (OSCE/ODIHR 2016). The amendments are called “On Changes 
and Amendments to Some Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan On Countering Extremism 
and Terrorism2“ and were ratified in 2017 (hereafter: the amendments or the amendments of 
2017). These amendments functioned as a reaction to three events that took place in 2016: an 
amok-run in Almaty, a serious act of terrorism in Aktobe and nation-wide protests. All of these 
events were untypical for the otherwise stable situation in Kazakhstan. This offers an opportunity 
to find out whether the content of the amendments reflects their creators (agents) rational (event-
specific) decision-making or whether it represents the next step of a developmental trajectory 
                                                 
1  Agents are individuals that design or enact measures or laws. 
2  All quotations of Kazakhstani legal documents are translations by the author unless stated otherwise. 
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that is locked-in in path dependence (structure) and maintained by irrational decision-making 
(e.g. habits).  I will study two mutually exclusive hypotheses, stating that these amendments 
represent legislation: 
 
(1) that is made by rational decision-making (rational-choice theory), i.e. specifically tuned 
to the events that caused the amendments, independently of previous legislation. 
(2) that is made by path dependence (historical institutionalism), i.e. it has incrementally 
reinforced long-established repressive legislation, with no relation to the events that 
caused the amendments. 
 
Note, that the hypotheses form extremes of a discussion between agency-perspectives of 
rational-choice and structural-perspectives of historical institutionalism. Results of the analysis 
are interpreted relatively as being more or less agreeing with one of the two hypotheses. These 
hypotheses have an ideal character and not are not expected to be fully encountered in real 
legislation: new legal provisions are never fully independent of previous legislation.  
In this thesis chapter I elaborates the theoretical background for the analysis of the laws. 
Chapter II introduces Kazakhstan’s repressive institutional landscape and describes the two 
attacks in Almaty and Aktobe and the nationwide protests in 2016. Chapter III relates these 
attacks and protests to the content of the amendments and their legal history. 
 
CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
Studies Repression by States 
In order to understand state repression (hereafter: repression), it is necessary to distinguish 
between repression and coercion: repression is a form of coercion, but not all coercion is 
repression (deMeritt 2017, 3). The meaning of coercion by social structures like governments 
and societies has been debated since antiquity. It was pointed out that the essence of laws and 
rules is coercive because e.g. they force desired behaviour by punishing undesired behaviour 
(Anderson 2015). Thus, coercion has been described as the law-enforcing power that maintains 
order in society. For example, coercion is seen as the force “by which some members of society 
act in an organized manner to enforce the law by discovering, deterring, rehabilitating, or 
punishing people who violate the rules and norms governing that society” (Butterworth 1974, 
358). From such a perspective, coercion can be understood as a means to protect freedom and 
human rights of individuals in a society. On the other hand, coercion can also infringe upon 
freedom and human rights. If so, coercion is called repression (DeMeritt 2-17, 3-4). 
 DeMerrit (2017) and Davenport and Inman (2012) note, that there are two core findings 
of the agency-focussed literature on the conditions and incentives that sustain repression. First, 
repressive tactics have been used to reach one primarily important strategic objective of 
governments that repress, namely: to contain political dissent3 (deMeritt 2017, 1) and, more 
precisely, to contain “those who challenge existing power relationships” (Davenport 1996, 377). 
                                                 
3  “Political dissent refers to any expression designed to convey dissatisfaction with or opposition to the policies of 
a governing body. Such expression may take forms from vocal disagreement to civil disobedience to the use of 
violence. Historically, repressive governments have sought to punish political dissent” (Cram 101 2016). 
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At times, scholars have included these aims in their definitions of repression. For example, Josua 
and Edel (2015) define repression as “the sum of all strategies by ruling elites to contain 
challenges to their rule by constraining (raising the costs of contention for) or incapacitating 
opposition leaders, rank-and-file activists, or parts of the politically inactive population.”   
 Secondly, types of regime matter. It is assumed that repression is highest in states that are 
in between autocratic and democracy. This is assumed because (1) political leaders of autocracies 
do not need to repress their citizens as they are politically unengaged by knowing that political 
dissent is severely punished and (2) political leaders in democracies cannot repress, because their 
powers are restricted by democratic institutions, like for example fair elections (deMeritt 2017, 
1;8). 
 Authoritarian regimes (like Kazakhstan) are somewhere in the middle but on the 
autocratic side of the continuum between autocracy and democracy. The repressive tactics of 
authoritarian regimes apply not only law enforcement agencies, the armed and special forces, 
informally hired thugs and assassins but also legal measures to delimit threats to their power 
(Rudbeck, Mukherjee and Nelson 2016; Varol 2015; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014, 334). The 
authoritarians’ use of legal measures Varol (2015) called „Stealth Authoritarianism “, which 
means that legal mechanisms look democratic but are used for anti-democratic ends (Varol 2015, 
1684). 
 All the post-Soviet Central Asian states including Russia used these mechanisms to mask 
their repressive practices (von Soest and Grauvogel 2015). Varol analysed 5 types of such 
legislation. The first type concerned laws about judicial review. For example, Putin deployed 
judicial review by authorizing federal courts to nullify regional laws inconsistent with the federal 
constitution. While this looked legitimate and democratic, it meant in practice that the pro-Putin 
judicial elite in the constitutional court was activated to reduce vertical checks on the president’s 
power by regional governments (Varol 2015, 1689). The second type concerned defamation laws. 
Authoritarians have used these to undermine the public’s ability to voice political dissent and 
monitor their political leaders (Ibid. 1693). For example, to achieve this, between 5000 to 10,000 
defamation cases a year have been filed in Russia of which approximately 60% targeted 
journalists (Ibid., 1696). The third type concerned electoral legislation supposedly eliminating 
electoral fraud or promoting political stability but actually raising the costs of unseating a leader 
(Ibid., 1701). For example, in Zimbabwe laws to register voters were used to hinder parts of the 
population to vote. Further, electoral thresholds (with 10% it is the highest in the world) were 
used in Turkey to exclude participation of other political parties (Ibid., 1704). Moreover, 
campaign finance laws, like Russia's law on foreign agents, were used to hinder the political 
influence of civil society organisations and NGO’s (Ibid., 1706). The fourth type concerned how 
non-political crimes (such as tax evasion, fraud, and money laundering) were used to covertly 
repress the opposition (Ibid. 1708). Lastly, the fifth type concerned surveillance laws and 
institutions. These seemingly countered organized crime and terrorism, but were used to 
blackmail or persecute opponents for non-political crimes (Ibid., 1679). For example, Putin used 
the Russian Financial Monitoring Service to gather sensitive financial information to blackmail 
and to prosecute his opponents for non-political crimes (Ibid., 1712). 
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Agency and Structure: Rational-choice Institutionalism, Sociological 
Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism. 
All these repressive tactics have been analysed by the literature from perspectives of agency 
(deMeritt 2017; Davenport and Inman 2012), because they described what agents (policy and 
law makers) did to shape their environment. Instead, perspectives of structure would have 
described how the environment shaped the agents doing (Cairney 2012, 112). 
 The agency-oriented literature concerns mostly theories that are referred to as rational-
choice institutionalism or just rationality. Marginally, it also concerns theories that analyse what 
one could call irrational choice. Concerning state repression, deMerrit (2017) and Davenport and 
Inman (2012) only noted studies applying rational-choice theories. These assume agents (the 
initiators of measures) to rationally consider and then impose repressive measures in order to 
contain perceived threats of political dissent to their own or their leaders power. The rational 
considerations the agents apply, are understood as a logic whereby the agents search for 
decisions with the best cost-benefit ration. These decisions aim for maximum efficiency and are 
implied to be event-specific, i.e. dealing with specific features of events they want to counter. 
 Most rational-choice models assume a notion of bounded rationality. Bounded rationality 
takes into account, among others, that (1) a set agenda forces an agent to only consider certain 
measures, that (2) an agents’ cognitive abilities are limited and (3) that other complex contextual 
factors delimit the number and nature of the measures that can be considered by the agents 
(Cairney 2012, 95; 175; 126). 
 There are few models that incorporate the opposite of rational-choice, i.e. irrationality. 
Meierheinrich (2016) offers one such model concerning the decision-making that underlies law-
formation. In reference to Weber (1978, 24-25) Meierheinrich discerns between four ideal legal 
actions which are instrumental, traditional, affectual or value-oriented (Meierheinrich 2016, 
237). Instrumental legal actions are rational in the sense that they are the consequences of cost-
benefit considerations. This means in turn, that all other types of legal action are more irrational: 
traditional legal actions follow as an automatic reaction to habitual stimuli. For example, law 
makers can be accustomed to increase punishments for illegal assembly when violent protests 
take place repeatedly. Affectual legal actions follow from decisions that are made under 
influence of strong feelings. For example, law makers can introduce repressive laws that punish 
all religious practitioners out of a feeling of revenge for a perpetrated act of religious-associated 
terrorism. Value-oriented legal actions follow from decisions that are oriented toward an ultimate 
value, i.e. actors form the law in accordance with their beliefs, morals or convictions. For 
example: in Brunei one can be stoned to death (Müller 2015) because government officials 
believe that the punishments of Shariah-law are intrinsically righteous.   
 On the other hand, the structure-oriented literature is based on theories like historical 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and complexity theory (Fioretos, 2016). These 
theories assume, that there are many complex contextual factors that determine the development 
of systems and the decision-making of agents. Complexity theory might take just about 
everything into account (e.g. the geographic location of a state or the culture of a country) 
(Cairney 2012, 175), whereas historical and sociological institutionalism narrow their focus by 
concentrating on contextual factors that are called institutions. Institutions are distinguished as 
being formal or informal. Informal institutions refer to the invisible rules that influence 
behaviour, e.g. traditions, beliefs and ideologies. Formal institutions are visible and/or set out on 
paper, e.g. organisations, rules and laws (Cairney 2012, 69-94). Generally, sociological and 
 7 
historical institutionalism are similar. But historical institutionalism focusses more on diachronic 
analyses and sociological institutionalism more on synchronic ones (Fioretos 2016). In the next 
subsection I will describe, how this thesis combines historical institutionalism with the agency-
conceptions of Weber and Meierheinrich to describe models of path dependence in formal 
institutions like the law. 
  
Institutional Development: Path Dependence and Mechanisms of Reinforcement 
Institutionalization is the process by which institutions are created. Institutions are made to 
persist and do so in most cases. Douglass North (1994) gives various explanations for this by 
noting, first, that formal institutions (as in governmental organisations) are built to be resilient 
against political actors that want to radically change or abolish them. Secondly, formal 
institutions are sustainable because they are supposed to reduce uncertainty and enhance stability 
(Denzau and North 1994, 43). Thirdly, formal institutions are entwined in complex social 
interdependencies with other institutions: social networks, career opportunities and shared 
operations between institutions are important reasons to sustain them (Pierson 2011, 26-27). 
Fourth, established institutions spread certain perspectives and discourses that justify their 
existence (Ibid., 39). 
 Institutions tend to develop within stable trajectories, which are sometimes called 
virtuous or vicious spirals (Acemoglu 2012). In turn, these are called incremental and inert, 
when they are understood as sequences that evolve infrequently and by small steps, whereby 
each step is highly dependent on the previous step. Such developmental trajectories often show 
increases of variables but no significant changes of variables. The essence of these institutions 
remains largely unchanged over time. 
 Inert developments are at times labelled as path dependent (see figure 1). I will follow 
Mahoney’s (2000) conceptualization of path dependence. It discerns three aspects. First of all, a 
path dependent trajectory finds its origins in what is called a critical juncture. A critical juncture 
refers to a point in time when a particular institutional arrangement is adopted from several 
alternatives. Secondly, critical junctures are considered to be contingent. Contingency refers to 
the inability of a theory to predict or explain the occurrence of a specific outcome. Thirdly, the 
point in time when a juncture occurs is critical, because once a particular option is selected it 
becomes progressively more difficult to re-select one of the alternative initial options; after an 
institutional arrangement has been adopted the developmental trajectory is relatively locked in 
deterministic causal patterns (see lock-in in figure 1) (Mahoney 2000, 511-513). 
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Figure 1: A conceptual framework on path dependence (Sydow 2009, 4). 
  
Yet, the persistent development of institutions and policies does not imply the absence of change. 
Rather, path dependency implies that changes occur continuously, although incrementally and 
locked-in within a stern frame of development. Various contextual factors reinforce this locked-
in trajectory and thereby produce incremental development4. 
 I propose two concrete models of how path dependence can be conceived in legal 
development. Concerning the law, I understand a critical juncture as a contingent point in time 
when a concept is formed and incorporated in law that is thereupon locked-in (reproduced and 
reinforced) in a succession of laws and articles through time. One can understand this in two 
ways. First, as an expanding system of intertextual references between laws and articles that 
reinforce an idea (a certain text) that was introduced in some past (Figure 2). Second, as an 
increase in the number of values and variables used to describe this same idea in legal texts 
(Figure 3). 
 
Figure 2: Legal path dependence as the continued intertextual expansion of a legal idea through time (T) 
 
                                                 
4 Thereby, as an important side note, these incremental changes can marginally diverge from the locked-in 
trajectory, which might lead to significant changes in the long-run (Thelen 2010). 
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Figure 3: Path dependence as the continued expansion of variables and values of the same idea through time (T) 
 
Thus, a certain legal provision that aims at repressing a certain form of political dissent is path 
dependently reinforced, when the specific content of this provision is repeated in an expanding 
amount of repressive laws and measures. Additionally, such a provision is reinforced, when, in 
its related articles, an increasing number of variables is punishable or when the severity of 
punishments increases. 
 Gerschewski (2013) discerns three mechanisms that reinforce locked-in trajectories, 
namely endogenous, exogenous and reciprocal reinforcement 5 . Endogenous mechanisms 
reinforce a path dependent trajectory by its own internal mechanisms, there is no influence from 
external disturbances. This development is fully self-reinforcing and can, for example, be 
typified by legal actions that Meierheinrich and Weber denoted as value-oriented or traditional 
legal actions (Meierheinrich 2016, 237).  These concern the mere familiarity with previous 
actions or certain believes, convictions or ideologies about what action is appropriate or morally 
correct. Such legal actions reinforce institutions even if this is disadvantageous (Mahoney, 2000, 
523). For example, laws repressing homosexuality can be reinforced by value-oriented legal 
actions. This happens because the law-makers are convinced that homosexuality is immoral 
(Asal and Summer 2016). Even-though from a rational cost-benefit perspective this is clearly 
disadvantageous, e.g. this repression hinders a significant part of the working force in the 
country. 
 The second type of trajectory is driven by exogenous reinforcement. This means that path 
dependence is triggered by external factors. This reinforcement can underlie, for example, 
instrumental (rational) or traditional legal actions (Meierheinrich 2016, 237). External factors 
can be rationally addressed by reinforcing existing provisions, which is beneficent and low in 
costs: instead of creating a whole new counterterrorism law, one can simply update existing 
provisions of the criminal codex by adding a concept of terrorism. Yet, law makers can also 
update a law out of habit: they might repeatedly reinforce institutions when re-occurring protest 
take place that threaten the regime. 
 The third type of trajectory is driven by reciprocal reinforcement (Gerschewski 2013). 
This means that path dependence is triggered by the development of other institutions (Mahoney, 
2000, 517). Amended law A can force law B to be amended as well, thereby reinforcing law B. 
For example, when new laws allow intelligence agencies to expand their monitory-functions, 
then the laws on monitoring financial transactions need to be adjusted to enable these changes. 
 
                                                 
5 Note, that Gerschewski (2013) understands the meaning of path dependence more specifically than Mahoney 
(2000). He assumes that path dependency can only be reinforced by endogenous mechanisms (Gerschewksi, 
2013, 23). 
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Path Dependence in Legal Institutions 
Studies on path dependence in legal institutions are mainly concerned with non-repressive laws 
in democratic states (see Sourgens 2016; Bell 2013; Hathaway 2013). I could hardly find any 
studies that analysed the path dependence in repressive law-formation, let alone in authoritarian 
states. 
 Pokalova (2015) showed how path dependence is an influential factor concerning the 
global development of separate counter-terrorism laws6. Because authoritarian regimes are prime 
examples for states that misuse counterterrorism laws to repress political dissent, her findings are 
of use here (Josua and Edel 2015, 9). They reveal that before the terrorist attack on eleven 
September 2001 in the U.S., state decisions to adopt new legislation correlated with the number 
of terrorist organizations operating in their territory. Since September 11, however, the existence 
of previous counterterrorism legislation and the participation of a state in the War on Terror 
correlates with the adoption of new legislation (Pokalova 2015, 474). Such development is path 
dependent and can be described as endogenous reinforcement, because it implies that 
counterterrorism legislation generates its own development independently of external or 
reciprocal factors (autopoiesis): it is its own cause (causa sui). 
 Asal and Sommer (2016) showed that similar findings also apply to laws that repress 
homosexuality in various nations. Many of these have developed since colonial times (Asal and 
Sommer 2016, 6). 
 These findings may elaborate a part of Gerschewski (2013) theory concerning the pillar 
of repression. Note that Gerschewski distinguishes three “pillars of stability” that secure 
autocratic regimes7.  They consist of legitimacy, repression and co-optation (see Figure 2). The 
pillars are reproduced and reinforced by endogenous, exogenous and reciprocal reinforcement 
(Gerschewski 2013, 23-24). 
                                                 
6 A specific counter-terrorism law is especially designed to counter terrorism. Such laws are not merely some 
additions that account for acts of terrorism in the criminal code. 
7  Autocracies are understood to include authoritarianism, totalitarianism and dictatorships (Gerschewski 2013). 
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Figure 2: The three pillars of stability (adapted from Gerschewski et al. 2013) 
 
There is one rare study about path dependence in the development of repressive legislation of 
authoritarian states. It compares the transitional developments of the repressive legal systems in 
Brazil, Chile and Argentina (Pereira 2005) and describes the repressive legal systems of the 
countries as continuations or breaks with pre-transitional institutional settings, i.e. from the time 
before coups toppled the respective regimes in the 20th century (Pereira 2005, 10). Concerning 
Brazil, Pereira found that, because there was high judicial-military consensus before the coup, 
after the coup regime repression was largely judicialized, and the legal system was modified 
conservatively and incrementally. Concerning Argentina, he found that, because the military 
broke with judicial elites before the coup, the military radically subverted traditional legal 
procedures and repressed political dissent ex-juridically. Concerning Chile, Pereira found that 
because before the coup cooperation between the military and judiciary was limited, after the 
coup repression took place mostly in military courts and not in civilian courts (Ibid., 194). 
 Although these coups were critical moments of regime-change that could be conceived as 
critical junctures, Pereira did not describe them as such. Instead, he wrote that he is not giving a 
“fully path dependent approach,” because he wants to avoid the debates associated with the 
concept (Ibid., 213). Yet, the inert development in the legal system of Brazil looks path 
dependent. This appears even more so, when this state, at that time an authoritarian regime, is 
placed within the theoretical framework of Gerschewski (2013) and associated with the findings 
of Pokalova (2015) and of Asal and Summer (2016). 
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Methodology 
The methodology will describe how and with what sources I am going to analyse if path 
dependent trajectories have formed the legal amendments that were enforced in January 2017, 
titled “On Changes and Amendments to Some Legal Acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan On 
Countering Extremism and Terrorism” (the amendments of 2017). For this, I will analyse two 
mutually excluding hypotheses, stating that these amendments represent legislation: 
 
(1) that is made by rational decision-making (rational-choice theory), i.e. specifically tuned 
to the events that caused the amendments, independently of previous legislation. 
(2) that is made by path dependence (historical institutionalism), i.e. it has incrementally 
reinforced long-established repressive legislation, with no relation to the events that 
caused the amendments. 
 
In order to distinguish whether the development of laws is path dependent or newly derived, I 
estimate the correspondence between the amendments and the events that were officially claimed 
to have caused them. This I will do as follows: the more correspondence there is between the 
features of the events and the content of the amendments, the more it is supported that the 
amendments are developed specifically as a reaction to the events (i.e. the attacks in Aktobe and 
Almaty as well as the nationwide protests of April in 2016). On the other hand, the more 
correspondence there is between the amendments and previous legal provisions, the more it is 
supported that the amendments are unrelated to the events and instead are subsequent increments 
of previous legislation. 
 This correspondence will be indicated by searching whether features of the events (as 
they were described in the media) are accounted for in the amendments. If the specific features 
of the events match the specific features of some of the amendments, these amendments are 
specifically designed to address the events. For example: the amendments introduced stricter 
regulations to protect weapon-shops. The terrorists in Aktobe attacked two weapon-shops. The 
weapon-shop is a feature of the event and also a feature of the amendments, thus the 
amendments are event-specific. 
 If the features of the event do not correspond to a counterpart in the amendments or vice 
versa, it is checked if the amendments features are related to the features of previous legal 
provisions. For example: the amendments introduced new measures for banning religious 
literature. Yet, only the attack in Aktobe was marginally religiously motivated. Thus, the events 
and the amendments have only a few shared features. On the other hand, the amendments share a 
lot of features with previous legislation. The oldest legislation seems to be established in 1929. 
Clearly, the amendments are subsequent increments of a long-established repressive legislation, 
locked-in in path dependence. 
  Thus, the longer in time the repressive content of the amendments of 2017 has persisted 
in previous laws, the more this repressive content is locked-in in path dependence. The 
persistence of this content through time will be disclosed by path-tracing the content through 
legal history (Tulia 2006, 1). This will be made explicit by historical narration (Büthe 2002, 
482), which will elaborate the developments in relation to the mechanisms of endogenous, 
exogenous and reciprocal reinforcement (Geschewski’s 2013). The concrete meaning of these 
mechanisms will in turn be elucidated with reference to instrumental, affectual, traditional or 
value-oriented legal actions (Meierheinrich 2016; Weber 1978). 
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 Concerning the sources: laws are reliable sources of information, because they are 
recognized by the government to represent the official standards of order in state and society. For 
analysing the content of the amendments of 2017 and for analysing their legal history, I will use 
the official and online law-archives of Kazakhstan as they are published on the websites zakon.kz 
and adilet.kz. For analysing the media-reports on the causal events of the amendments of 2017, 
my study relies primarily on governmental sources. The governmental sources are Akorda.kz (the 
official website of Kazakhstan's government), Knb.kz (the official website of Kazakhstan’s 
National Security Committee), Inform.kz (state media) and the state-supported and popular news-
outlet Tengrinews.kz. To offer indications of how and why the laws are enforced in Kazakhstan, I 
have additionally used non-governmental and international sources. These are the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Freedom House (FH), Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), Forum 18, the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law 
(KIBHR) and the International Foundation for Protection of Freedom of Speech “Adil soz” (Adil 
soz). News-reports from international media-outlets refer to Eurasianet.org and 
Thediplomat.com. 
 
  
CHAPTER II: KAZAKHSTAN AS A CASE-STUDY 
In order to provide for a full analysis of path dependence, it is necessary to determine a critical 
juncture (Mahoney 2000, 511-513). Yet, it turned out that the determination of critical junctures 
for the separate laws or even for their specific content takes too much space and would reach far 
beyond the time-span of this thesis, which focusses its analysis on developments between 1991 
and 2017. This is because some of the path dependent trajectories have roots that go as far as the 
late 18th century, which will be indicated later in this chapter. Thus, instead of determining 
critical junctures, this thesis focusses on the most recent parts of the locked-in phases of path 
dependent developments of a selection of repressive laws in Kazakhstan. 
 Moreover, there is not enough contingency to determine the fall of the Soviet Union as a 
critical juncture. Some scholars correctly predicted before 1991 that repressive institutions 
(organizations and laws) in today's Kazakhstan would still root in the Soviet Union. Examples of 
such institutions will be given, which will introduce the institutional landscape of post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan. It appears that path dependence formed the exemplified repressive institutions, 
because they developed mainly in dependence of their own causes (causa sui) rather than of a 
causal relation with external events. This is supported by comparing indexes of state repression 
with databases measuring terrorist attacks and protests. Then, the amendments of 2017 are 
introduced as the object of analysis. Three untypical events for pre-2016 Kazakhstan are 
described that the government has referred to as the (in)official causes for the amendments. 
 
1917 and 1991 as Critical Transitions 
As it turned out, the path dependent trajectories of the in 2017 amended articles can be traced 
into such a distant past, that this thesis refrains from tracing the critical junctures that originally 
established these articles. Critical junctures for some of the laws are expected to lay hidden in the 
Russian Empire. Thus, even the October Revolution in 1917 seems not critical enough to have 
inhibited the transfer of significant repressive content from laws of the Russian Empire to laws 
of the Soviet Union (Newton 2015, 9). Likewise, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
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 The transition of 1991 was so broad in scope, that it was recognized as a critical juncture 
by scholars (Forest and Johnson 2011). Yet, Loung shows that the fall of the Soviet Union was 
not contingent, i.e. it was predicted by many (see also Lipset and Bence 1994) and it was also 
predicted to leave intact most locked-in developmental paths of the Soviet institutional landscape 
in Central Asia. Scholars predicted correctly that most of the institutions after 1991 would 
remain the same as before (Luong 2002, 260-261; 278), because most Soviet elites would retain 
their high positions after 1991 and thereby keep the authoritarian features of the Central Asian 
Soviet Republics in place (Ibid., 53). 
  The specific context of Kazakhstan supports these findings. Despite the transition of 
1991, Kazakhstan's president remained in the government with many of his close allies from the 
Soviet nomenklatura8. President Nursultan Nazarbayev was elected the first president of the 
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR) on the 24th of April 1990, was re-elected president of 
the Republic of Kazakhstan on the 1st of December 1991 and remained president until today 
(October 2017) keeping many of his close allies in high positions around him (Collins 2006; 
Isaacs 2009; Freedom House 2011-2016). Thereby, old institutions remained largely unchanged 
(Khalid 2007, 78-79) as will be described below: 
Kazakhstan’s present legal provisions concerning registration of the population inherited 
many features of the so-called propiska-institution introduced in the 1930s in the Soviet Union. 
Literally, the word propiska means “inscription”, referring to the inscription in a state internal 
passport permitting a person to reside in a place and then benefit from its public services. The 
propiska-institution was a tool for recording as well as (repressively) controlling migration. This 
system, again, has its roots in a similar institution form the Russian Empire (Tukmadiyeva 2015, 
1-3). 
Before the October revolution in 1917, Lenin (1903) criticized the Russian empire for its 
migration institution, calling it “serfdom” and “an outrage against the people” (Lenin 1903). As a 
consequence, its registration-system was abandoned around the 1920’s together with the 
provisions for passports and ID-cards (Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee 
1923). Instead, a system with so-called “work books” was set up (Ibid., 1919). Unfortunately, 
functionaries soon concluded that the population needed to be monitored and controlled 
intensively to make the command economy of the Soviet Union work. One reason for this was 
the absence of a free market system: because prices became unified over the whole Soviet Union, 
one could not determine deficits by analysing financial statistics; the official costs of housing and 
consumer goods did not reflect their relative deficits. As the government alone was allocating all 
the goods, it needed to know beforehand where the goods had to be allocated to. This could only 
function with efficiency, when most people stayed put at their place of residency and when there 
was sufficient information about their needs, deeds and occasionally granted movement 
(Tukmadiyeva 2015, 8). Because of this, the registration system of the Russian Empire was 
modified and (re-)introduced together with a dual passport-system. This whole complex was 
called the propiska-institution. Similarly to the Russian Empire, the functionaries of the Soviet 
Union started to use this system also as a tool for repression (Buckley 1995). For example, the 
government stopped citizens from leaving their cities by denying them an inscription for leaving 
the city. Or the government denied a citizen to get an inscription to enter the city, which then 
deprived the citizen of his rights to use the local public services. 
                                                 
8 The nomenklatura (номенклатура) were key state-functionaries in the Soviet Union. 
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 In the 1980s, human rights organizations started to criticize the propiska-institution 
(Tukmadiyeva 2015, 5). In 1991, the USSR recognized the propiska-institution to be 
unconstitutional and contrary to international obligations (Conclusion of the Committee for 
Constitutional Supervision of the USSR 1991). After the collapse of the USSR, Georgia and 
Moldova abolished the institution. Latvia and Estonia changed the institution to an informational 
registration mechanism (only used to inform the government). Yet, in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
in Central Asia and especially in Kazakhstan the institution was largely preserved and the word 
propiska was changed to “registration” (Tukmadiyeva 2015, 36). 
 Another example of such a long-inherited institution in Kazakhstan concerns the 
Religious Administration of Muslims (DUM), known as the Muftiate. It is present in all post-
Soviet Central Asian states and Russia. It was first establishment in the Russian Empire. In 1788 
Catherine II established in Orenburg the so-called Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly 
(OMDS) (Khalid 2007, 36). In 1943 its name was changed to the Spiritual Directorate of 
Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) (Ibid., 78). After the fall of the Soviet Union 
every Central Asian state reinstated its own religious administration. Kazakhstan’s religious 
administration has been called DUMK since then. Its functions have remained essentially the 
same as those in 1788. It is still headed by a supreme mufti, who oversees the appointment of 
imams and management of mosques. As before, the institute is used by the state to suppress 
political dissent. 
 The Soviet practice to repress religious groups has also remained in Kazakhstan and most 
other Central Asian republics as well as Russia. In Soviet times all practitioners of Islam that 
were registered within the DUM belonged to the “official Islam.” The non-registered 
practitioners of Islamic faith belonged to “unofficial” or “parallel” Islam (Lenz-Raymann 2014, 
135). This unapproved religious activity was persecuted severely by the KGB until 1988 in 
whole Central Asia, mostly for fear of political dissent (Khalid 2007, 118). Today, Kazakhstan’s 
national security committee (KNB) persecutes the same unregistered religious activity but 
instead calls it “untraditional” (Ibid., 228).  This typology of “traditional” and “untraditional” 
religious associations spread all over post-Soviet Central Asia and Russia (Knysh 2004). It is still 
used for both Islamic as well as non-Islamic (e.g. Christian) denominations. Notably, next to its 
repressive practices, almost all other organizational features of today's KNB have remained the 
same as those of the KGB before (McDermott and Lefebvre 2008).      
 The Soviet legacy of religious persecution is also visible in Kazakhstan’s laws. 
Kazakhstan’s present legal provisions on religious associations inherited many features of the 
Resolution of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's 
Commissars of the RSFSR of April 8, 1929 “On Religious Associations” (All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee 1929). This resolution was a part of the so-called “legislation on religious 
cults”, which consisted of many secret acts that were only for official use. This legislation 
formed the legal basis for religious repression in Kazakhstan between 1930 and 1988 (Khalid 
2007, 118). Among others, the resolution allowed activity of missionaries, clerics and religious 
organisation only after their registration by a special state body (the Council for Religious Affairs 
under the Council of Ministers of the USSR). If the activities of clerics, missionaries or 
organizations were not registered (with intention or without), they were persecuted (Podoprigora 
2002, 4.1). Also, censure on all literature, including religious texts, was common. Today (10. 
2017) Kazakhstan’s government tries to control and subdue religious groups with essentially the 
same provisions (Podoprigora 2002; Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2011A). 
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 Additionally, Kazakhstan adjusted Soviet laws with more democratic frames, which 
seemingly protect human rights but are used to repress religious groups and other perceived 
dissenters, i.e. “stealth authoritarianism” (Varol 2015). There is, for example, notorious article 
174 of the Criminal Code, since 1997 titled “Incitement of Social, National, Clan, Racial, or 
Religious hatred or Discord” (Criminal Code 1997; Criminal Code 2014). Its content is 
essentially the same as article 60 of the Criminal Code of the Kazakh USSR of 1959 that is titled 
“Violation of national and racial equality” (Criminal Code 1959). Article 60 has been expanded 
incrementally over time until it obtained its current form under article 174: 
 
Article 174: “Intentional actions aimed at incitement of social, national, tribal, racial, class or 
religious hatred, to insult national honour and dignity or religious feelings of citizens, as well as 
propaganda of exclusivity, superiority or inferiority of citizens on the basis of their attitude to 
religion, class, national, genetic or racial origin; if these acts are committed in public or through 
the use of mass media or telecommunications networks, as well as through manufacturing or 
distribution by literature or other media, promoting social, national, generic, racial, class or 
religious discord -  are punished by restraint of liberty for a term of two to seven years, or 
imprisonment for the same period.” (Criminal Code 2014) 
 
Articles punishing hate-speech are common in the laws of democratic countries. What differs 
between article 174 and democratic laws is first of all the vague word “discord.” Democratic 
laws punish hate-speech but not quarrels. Discord is considered part of freedom of speech. 
Secondly, the punishments are enormously high, namely 2 or 7 years of restricted freedom or 
imprisonment. In contrast, the Dutch law gives maximally 1 year of imprisonment (Law of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands 1881, article 137c and d). Thirdly, the enforcement of the article is 
problematic because of its arbitrary interpretation (Corley 2017C). In democratic countries, 
people mostly receive a warning or a fine and only in extreme cases they are sentenced for 
imprisonment. Yet in Kazakhstan article 174 provides a rhetoric framework for a wide range of 
acts of repression, i.e. persecution of unregistered religious practitioners, of people that voice 
political dissent on the media or plan protests, riots and even (terroristic) attacks - because all of 
this could be said to incite religious or social discord (Mushfig 2017). 
 Moreover, the described crimes in article 174 are, according to article 3-39 of the same 
Criminal Code (2014), considered “extremist crimes”. In the law “On Countering Extremism” 
the content of article 174 returns. When analysing this content, it becomes noticeable that 
extremism includes non-violence also: it is written that so-called nationalist extremism is “the 
incitement of racial, national and clan discord, including those related to violence or calls for 
violence” (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2005). The broad meanings of discord as well as 
non-violent extremism leave space for arbitrary prosecution of any supposed political dissent. 
This is why the OSCE has continually recommended Kazakhstan to change the notion of 
extremism to “violent extremism” (OSCE/ODIHR 2016, 13), so that extremism becomes only 
punishable when violence is used. This would make the law more precise and less arbitrary when 
enforced. 
 However, the repressive potential of this and the other described institutions is still being 
reinforced today. This reinforcement appears to be part of a locked-in phase of path dependent 
developments that started in the Soviet Union or have origins in the Russian Empire and beyond. 
This statement will be supported by showing that the continued reinforcement is occurring 
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mostly in no relation with the occurrences of threatening events (like terroristic attacks or 
massive demonstrations). Instead, it seems to generate itself. 
 
Pre-2016: Repression and Political Dissent 
Many repressive institutions (organizations and laws) in Kazakhstan are still recognized as 
coming from the Soviet Union or even the Russian Empire. Thus, development is incremental. 
Pokalova (2015) and Asal (2016) have shown that if such incremental development has little 
correlation with external factors it can be called path dependent. 
 Because governmental repression in Kazakhstan is high while the severity of protests or 
terrorist attacks is low, I think, that Kazakhstan’s government is either overreacting or it is 
continuing repression by path dependence. To show this, the level of state repression is indicated 
by measures of the Political Terrors Scale (PTS). In comparison, the frequency and vehemence 
of protests and terrorist attacks are indicated by the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human 
Rights (KIBHR 2015) and by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). 
 The Political Terror Scale measures state repression in Kazakhstan between 1993 and 
2016. The lower the scale, the less repressive the state: scale 1 is non-repressive and scale 5 
means extremely repressive. From 1993 till 2012 the average index — based on annual reports 
from Amnesty International and US State Department — for Kazakhstan is 2.48. From 2013 till 
2016 the average index — based additionally on Human Rights Watch reports — for Kazakhstan 
is 2.9 (Gibney, Cornett, Wood, Haschke, and Arnon 2016).  State repression in Kazakhstan is 
thus slightly increasing and hinges currently towards level 3, which indicates that: 
 
„There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution 
or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a 
trial, for political views is accepted.” (Ibid.) 
 
While this scale-description indicates continuous repression by the government, the number of 
incidents of political dissent has been low in pre-2016 Kazakhstan. The Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) indicates a low threat of terrorism in pre-2016 Kazakhstan. It shows reliable 
information for about 14 terroristic attacks in 22years (between 1993 and 2015)9. 18 people were 
killed of which 3 concerned the assailants themselves. In total 7 people were wounded. With one 
exception, the causalities of each attack reached a maximum of 2 fatalities and 2 injuries (START 
2016A). The exception concerns a range of suicide attacks that occurred in 2011 in the cities 
Aktobe (May 17), Astana (May 24), Atyrau (October 31) and Taraz (November 13). All of the 
attacks were targeted against the KNB or the police. Only the attack in Taraz was successful. It 
caused 8 fatalities: a suicide-terrorist killed 2 civilians after robbing a weapon shop, 5 law-
enforcement officers and finally himself (Rakisheva and Morrison 2014, 104). Yet, even the 
numbers of this only exception reflect no real threat of terrorism, when compared to e.g. the 
atrocities in Paris on the 13th of November 2015, where 136 people lost their lives in one day. 
                                                 
9 GTD mentioned 4 incidents that I deemed not applicable. These concerned 2 cases about attacks on journalist 
that were perpetrated by government officials and not terrorist (GTD ID: 201308200004; 201204190056) and 2 
cases with no sources (GTD ID: 199712100001; 199701080002). After analysing Kazakhstan's media, I deemed 
these last two cases to be forms of crime unrelated to terrorism (see RFERL 1997; Sharipzhan 1779). 
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 The academic literature on terrorism reveals that terroristic attacks in Kazakhstan are of a 
rebellious kind as they tended not to attack civilians (Piazza 2009, 65; 76): of the 14 attacks 13 
targeted law enforcement agencies or governmental buildings (START 2016A)10. Consequently, 
terrorism in Kazakhstan is considered to be an offshoot of the criminal sphere (Beissembayev 
2016). Concerning the attack in Taraz in 2011 this was supported by various governmental 
officials, among others the president himself (Tengrinews 2011A). 
 Concerning protests in Kazakhstan. The frequency of protests has been declining from 
158 protests in 2011 to 71 in 2015.  The number of protesters has been declining, namely from 
9796 people (62 per protest) in 2012 to about 1230 people (17 per protests) in 2015. The average 
duration of the protests declined from about an hour in 2014 to around thirty minutes in 2015 
(KIBHR 2015). In pre-2016 there was only one serious protest that attracted serious domestic 
and international attention. It happened in Zhanaozen in 2011. An initially peaceful worker-strike 
changed into a violent demonstration, where hundreds were wounded and the police killed 16 
people (Satpayev and Umbetaliyeva 2015, 125-126). Yet, even this protest has been relatively 
small and short-lived, when compared to e.g. the 150’000 participants that protested in Russia on 
the 26th of March 2017 for the one day (RBC, 2017) or even to Armenia where protests with such 
numbers are common (Way and Levitsky 2006; Atanesian 2016). 
 Having indicated, that state repression is growing and protests as well as acts of terrorism 
are low in level and decreasing, I expect that state repression is not motivated by external factors 
(i.e. not event-specific) but by locked-in path dependent developments from the Soviet Union, 
the Russian Empire and beyond. The same is expected for the content of amendments of 2017 
that will be analysed in chapter III. Yet, there is also reason to expect new and event-specific 
forms of legislation. Because, if the untypical occurs, then legislation might react to this in 
untypical ways as well. And notably, the amendments (2017) were framed as responses to three 
events of which two were highly untypical for pre-2016 Kazakhstan: a high-casualty terrorist 
attack in Aktobe and nation-wide protests. The third event is more common and concerns an 
amok run in Almaty in 2016. 
  
Causes for the amendments of 2017: official and unofficial 
Kazakhstan’s legal arsenal of repressive measures was enhanced in spring 2017 by the 
ratification and rapid enforcement of a package of amendments claimed to counter religious 
extremism and terrorism. The two official reasons for the amendments were the violent crimes 
that occurred in 2016 in (1) Aktobe on the 5th of June and in (2) Almaty on the 1st of July 
(Akorda, 2016 B). Implicitly president Nazarbayev broadcasted a third reason, namely the 
nationwide protests held in May and April 2016. These nationwide protests focused in Atyrau 
(Putz 2016 D). At first, the Aktobe attacks and the protests in Atyrau seem to have no mutual 
relations. However, in his speech on the 8th of July 2016, Nazarbayev implicitly brought them 
together by describing both as forms of subversive warfare led from abroad. In a Russian 
fashion, he described the protests as “colour revolutions” that gave birth to terrorism (Akorda 
2016A; Putz 2016C; Gorenburg 2014; Korsunskaya 2014; RIA Novosti 2017). 
 The violent attacks in Aktobe at the 5th and 8th of June 2016 were internationally 
acknowledged as acts of terrorism (Bureau of Counterterrorism 2017) and are described by the 
                                                 
10  The one incident left out concerns an attack at a school (GTD ID: 200801270005). 
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following main features: like most other terroristic attacks in Kazakhstan the attacks were 
targeted against non-civilian targets like law enforcement and security personnel. About 25 
people robbed two gun-shops and unsuccessfully attacked a military outpost. Most of the 
attackers were caught or killed. There were 25 fatalities (7 victims, 18 perpetrators). About 45 
people helped to plan the attacks (Kassenova 2016A). Tengrinews reports, that they were at least 
partly motivated by religious (Islamic) grounds, because tapes from extremist Imams in Syria 
were found at some of the terrorists unregistered apartments (Kassenova 2016B). 
 Concerning the amok-run in Almaty at the 18th of July 2016 Tengrinews reported that a 
gunman killed several policemen in Almaty (Tengrinews 2016A). The gunman was sentenced to 
death for terrorism (Esenkulova 2016). This meant lifelong imprisonment because there is a 
moratorium on executions since 2003 (Tengrinews 2003). However, this killing spree seems to 
have more characteristics of an amok run (Saint Martin 1999). For example, the perpetrator 
explained his motivation for killing several law enforcement officers as revenge for having been 
imprisoned. This revenge was not motivated by any religious or political grounds (Kozjametov 
2016). 
 The nationwide protests in April 2016 were mostly concentrated in Atyrau, where around 
1000 people gathered in the city centre. Other cities — like Almaty, Aktobe, Semey and Uralsk 
— also witnessed protests, albeit with much less participants (Human Rights Watch 2016C; BBC 
2016; Tengrinews 2016B). The protests were against reforms that would enable foreigners to 
lease land in Kazakhstan. People feared that foreigners (especially Chinese) would buy the best 
land. To prevent further protests many activists were arrested in May 2016 (Tengrinews 2016B). 
Two human rights activists, Bokaev and Ayan, were sentenced to 5 years imprisonment on 
charges of i.a. “inciting social hatred” (Article 174 of the Criminal Code 2014) (Orozobekova 
2016). Their names appeared on the “list of organizations and persons associated with financing 
terrorism and extremism” (numbers 779 and 778), as published on the website of the ministry of 
finance (Committee for Financial Monitoring 2017). The governments reaction has been 
condemned internationally as a crackdown on political dissent and on the rights to freedom of 
speech and assembly (Human Rights Watch 2016B)11. 
 
CHAPTER III: PATH DEPENDENT INCREMENTAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
LAWS 
Did the above-mentioned attacks and the protest really cause the content of the amendments or 
was it mere path dependent reinforcement of long-established repressive legislation? In this 
chapter the amendments will be analysed in the following subsections: 
 
A) The Law “On Migration of the Population” 
B) The Law “On Religion” 
C) The Law “On Communication” 
D) The Law “On State Control over the Circulation Certain Types of Weapons” 
 
                                                 
11  The national security service of Kazakhstan (KNB) explained the protests as a preposterous machination of a 
famous businessman called Tokhtar Tuleshov who aimed to overthrow the government with the help of 
undefined foreign sources (Putz 2016A; Putz 2016B). 
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Per subsection I will firstly summarize the most important changes. Secondly, I will offer a 
critical analysis on the similarities of features between the amendments and the two terroristic 
attacks in Aktobe and Almaty as well as the nationwide protests (Chapter II). Thirdly, I will give 
a critically narrated history of the evolution of (1) the specific articles that are adjusted by the 
amendments of 2017 and (2) of the general law these articles are part of. 
 
A) The Law “On Migration of the Population” 
Summary of the main amendments 
The main amendments to the Law “On Migration of the Population” (hereafter: the law on 
migration) (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1997B) were the following: 
Article 17-1: 
• The concept “place of temporary stay (residence)” is added. This is an address, a 
building, a place or a dwelling in which a person resides temporarily. Relevant other 
articles have been updated with this concept to make the registration of a person’s 
temporary stay obligatory. 
• When applying for any sort of registration, be it for temporary or permanent stay, this 
will now officially be notified by the KNB. 
 
Article 492 of the Administrative Code (2014): 
• All non-registered Kazakhstanis have to be registered at their (temporary) residence 
within 10 days, otherwise they will receive a warning and have time to get registered 
within 1 month (previously 3 months). If Kazakhstanis stay at the (temporary) residence 
for longer than a month without registration, they will receive a fine. The fine has been 
increased from 5 to 7 monthly calculation indices (Zhovtis 2017), which is 0.1x the 
average salary per month of 367euro in 2017 (Uchet 2017). The article is nuanced a bit 
by article 2-45 in the law “On Housing Relations”, which states that guests, friends and 
family can be considered “temporary tenants” and only have to register within one 
month. No definitions of guests, friends or family are given (Law of Kazakhstan 1997). 
 
Article 493 of the Administrative Code (2014): 
• New definitions and heightened fines for landlords, who do not register the places they 
rent out or accept unregistered persons to live at their rented-out places. 
 
The relation to the attacks and nationwide protests 
There seems to be no correspondence between the features of the amendments to the Law “On 
Migration of the Population” (hereafter: the law on migration) and the features of the attack in 
Almaty. It is unclear if the gun-man was registered and there is no reason to believe that 
registration would have prevented the killing spree. At least, no such claims were found in the 
media. Also, the media did not relate the measures for registration to the nation-wide protests, 
although theoretically the registration-amendments might be useful to unearth activists or 
protesters.  
Akorda cited Nazarbayev putting the registration-measures in the context of fighting 
terrorism as it occurred in Aktobe (Akorda 2016C). The main argument for the amendments that 
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the media reported was that registration would generally make it harder for all terrorists to 
operate and could help to detect them. Inform.kz reported a senator saying this (Mejrambek 
2016C). Informbureau.kz reported law-enforcement agents supporting this (Marinets 2017). 
Notably, a similar explanation was also given in 2010, when laws on registration were somewhat 
strengthened with the goal to unearth hidden criminals and shadow activities (Asanbaev 2010). 
 Outside the government, the institutions and amendments concerned with registration 
were criticized heavily. Zhovtis12 (2016) noted, that terrorists would never register anything, let 
alone their housing. Zhovtis (2017) also claimed that the execution of the amendments on 
temporary registration cannot not be controlled: in order to find out if a person temporarily stays 
at a place for more than 10 days, it is necessary for the government to be notified about the 
persons first day of stay. For this one needs e.g. a lot of policemen constantly checking all places 
of residence or other mechanisms that would seriously infringe on rights to privacy. Also, 
Zhovtis underlined that without definitions of who is considered to be a guest, friend or family-
member, the registration laws cannot but be enforced properly. Tukmadieva (2015) added that 
despite the gradual tightening of pre-2016 legislation on registration, it was massively violated as 
most internal migrants could not even fulfil the conditions that allowed them to register 
permanently. As a result, the registration system in 2015 was a serious bureaucratic burden on 
the state apparatus and fertile ground for corruption and shadow activities (Tukmadieva 2015, 3). 
Notably, the latter was exactly the opposite of what senators intended to achieve with their 
registration measures in 2010 and in 2016 (Mejrambek 2016C; Asanbaev 2010). Additionally, 
the preliminary opinion of the OSCE on the amendments of 2017 stated that registration is not an 
effective way to combat terrorism (OSCE/ODIHR 2016, 21, paragraph 55). As Inform.kz reports, 
OSCE representative Anna-Lisa Chattel told the working group on the draft-law in 2016 that 
some countries already failed to fight terrorism by way of registration (Mejrambek 2016A). 
Unfortunately, all these critical remarks were ignored. 
All things considered, the amendments seem intended to address the attacks in Aktobe 
but have no significant corresponding features with the attacks. Although the working group was 
informed in 2016 and before, by many critics including the OSCE, about the 
disadvantageousness of the present registration-system, this has led to no revisions. On the 
contrary, it led to reinforcement of the same registration system. Thus, it appears that the 
working group was not significantly led by rational consideration about costs and benefits nor 
event-specificity but more by strong belief in and familiarity with the registration institutions. 
This indicates value-oriented and traditional legal action (see chapter I; Meierheinrich 2016). 
Additionally, the amendments do not contain anything new, as the next subsection will show. 
Much to the contrary, these measures were present in Kazakhstan's legislation all along since its 
independence, implying strong path dependency. 
 
Subsequent increments of long-established repressive legislation 
As noted in chapter II, Kazakhstan’s post-Soviet institutions inherited many features of the 
Soviet Union. Much of the Soviet system for population-registration seems to have been taken 
over. Just like around 1930, in 2017 registration is colloquially still called propiska, which refers 
                                                 
12  Evgenij Zhovtis is the Director of the Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law 
(KIBHR). 
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to a stamp in an internal passport in the USSR. Back then, there were both permanent 
(постоянная прописка) and temporary propiski (временная прописка) (Resolution of the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR 1974). Yet, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the first version 
of the law “On Migration of the Population” (1997) of independent Kazakhstan still included 
provisions for permanent and temporary registration. Article 51 stated concerning temporary 
registration that “internal migrants are obliged: to register at the place of residence and place of 
temporary residence in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the manner determined by 
the Government” (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1997B). The old administrative code of 
2001 stated in article 377: “Residence of citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan without [...] 
registration at the place of residence for more than ten calendar days - entails a warning or a fine 
in the amount of five monthly calculation indicators” (Administrative Code 2001). 
This provision remained unchanged until the new administrative code of 2014 slightly 
specified it in Article 492: “Residence without registration at the place of residence for a period 
of ten calendar days to three months - entails a warning or a fine of five monthly calculation 
indicators” (Administrative Code 2014). 
And then, in 2017, these laws were added upon by the amendments summarized in the 
first subsection. They added nothing new at all: a description of “registration of temporary stay” 
(article 1-17) and a few updates on related violations in the Administrative Code of 2014 (articles 
492 and 493). Legal provisions on permanent and temporary registration were already there in 
Kazakhstan's law. They have already been in place in the Soviet Union. And these, in turn, are 
legacies from the Russian Empire. 
 In conclusion: the amendments of 2017 reinforced long-established legal provisions from 
the Soviet-Union and the Russian Empire. The amendments of 2017 have developed by path 
dependent. This development seems reinforced by endogenous mechanisms, because, as was 
shown in the previous section, convictions about the value (value-oriented legal action) and long-
term familiarity with Soviet-style registration measures (traditional legal action) appear more 
important than consideration about these measures event-specificity or their costs and benefits. 
 
B) The Law “On Religion” 
Summary of the main amendments 
The main amendments to the Law “On religious activities and religious associations” (hereafter: 
the law on religion) (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2011) were the following: 
Article 1 
• The meaning of “missionary activity” has been extended by the concept of 
“dissemination of religious doctrine” (Article 1-5), namely “activities aimed at 
transferring or communicating information about the fundamental dogmas, ideas, views 
and practices of a particular religion” (article 1-4-1). Article 490 of the administrative 
code of 2014 has included this concept, making the simple talking about faith by non-
registered religious individuals punishable by “a fine for citizens of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan in the amount of one hundred monthly calculation indices [1.6x average 
salary per month of 367euro in 2017], for foreigners and stateless persons - in the amount 
of one hundred monthly calculated indices with administrative expulsion from the 
Republic of Kazakhstan.” 
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Articles 6 and 9: 
• The category “religious literature” has been added to the previous rules for “information-
materials of religious content” (article 9). The import of religious literature “is carried out 
only by registered religious associations after receiving a positive opinion of a religious 
expert examination” (article 6). An exception is made for religious literature “intended 
for personal use in one copy of each denomination” (article 6). Violation of this law 
“attracts a fine for individuals at a rate of fifty [0.8x average salary per month of 367euro 
in 2017] calculation indicators - and for legal entities at a rate of two hundred monthly 
calculation indicators [3.1x average salary per month of 367euro in 2017] with 
suspension of activity for a period of three months” (article 490-1 in Administrative Code 
201; Uchet 2017). 
 
Article 15-5 and 1-2-1 in the Law “On Tourism” (hereafter: law on tourism) 
• The law on tourism introduces the new term “religious tourism” (article 15-5). It focuses 
especially on pilgrimages. The provisions require pilgrims in Kazakhstan to register their 
places of temporary stay (article 1-2-1) (see law on migration). 
 
The relation to the attacks in Aktobe, Almaty and the nationwide protests 
Neither the attack in Almaty nor the nationwide protests were based on religious motivations, 
yet, the attacks in Aktobe were, Tengrinews reports (see chapter II): tapes from extremist Imams 
in Syria were found at some of the terrorists’ apartments (Kassenova 2016B; Ibid. 2016A). This 
might indicate that the amendments have corresponding features to the attack. Although, when 
looking at the summaries of the amendments above, there is no clear connection: maybe the 
criminal liability for the communication of dogmas by unregistered religious associations could 
apply to the Imam on the tape, who was probably not registered? Such an interpretation appears 
far-fetched and has not been noted in the media. 
 Nazarbayev explained at a meeting with the security council in 2016 that the terrorist 
attack in Aktobe was performed by a group of followers of the “untraditional religious movement 
of Salafism13” (Akorda 2016C). He spoke, that the amendments served to “give a decisive rebuff 
to everyone who, under the cover of religious slogans, will shake the situation in the country” 
(Ibid). How the amendments were supposed to do this becomes clear when looking at the 
original law on religion of 2011 (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2011A). The introduction 
of this law was motivated by a perceived lack of state control on religious activity. In 
Nazarbayev’s words: 
 
“it's about protecting the state from religious extremism […]. What these mosques are doing, no 
one knows. Nobody approves or registers them. This is the state, we must put our house in 
order.” (Tengrinews 2011B) 
 
Looking at the various provisions in the law on religion of 2011, the mentioned lack of state 
control is supposed to be filled by obligatory government approval and consequent registration 
of religious associations. The unapproved or registration-refusing associations are then left with 
                                                 
13  All quotations of Nazarbayev are translations by the author unless stated otherwise. 
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an unregistered status, making them liable for a whole range of violations; it makes them targets 
for persecution. Thus, the main idea is that deterrence will force religious associations to 
conform to the party-line (Zhovtis 2011). It also means, that the government can arbitrarily 
decide who is and who is not supposed to be persecuted. 
 This explains what the above summarized amendments mean. Their content indicates that 
persecution is build up by increasing the criminal liabilities of activities of non-registered 
religious associations and their associates. The reasoning behind this seems to be, that increased 
persecution of unregistered associations and their activities will discourage individuals to 
become or recruit terrorists and force them to instead adapt to the government line. Thus, it is not 
event-specificity that explains the motives for the amendments but its correspondence with 
previous legal provisions and policies. Influence of path dependence is expected here. 
 Furthermore, the repressive nature of the amendments of 2017 as well as the original 
provisions of 2011 have been strongly criticized. They have been criticized to be 
disadvantageous, because repression is predicted to increase violent opposition (Lenz-Raymann 
2014). Furthermore, this legislation was criticized to miss its point because religious extremists 
or terrorists are not expected to ever register but tend to hide themselves (Zhovtis 2011). 
Moreover, the law-makers knew about this critique, if not by the heated discussions in the 
media and parliament, then at least through the OSCE comments in 2009, the OSCE preliminary 
opinion in 2016 and by two reports of visiting UN rapporteurs (Kiai 2015; Bielefeldt 2015). 
Since 2009 the OSCE has kept recommending the omission of provisions for obligatory 
registration of religious associations, censorship over religious literature and all related 
administrative punishments (OSCE/ODIHR 2009; Ibid. 2016). Additionally, in 2016 it was 
recommended to reconsider the amendments in the sphere of tourism (OSCE/ODIHR 2016, pars 
76-79). Because all these forms of critique were ignored, it appears that the working group was 
immune to alternative views. Legal actions thus seem to be based on convictions about the 
existing legislation (value-oriented legal action) and familiarity with it (traditional legal action).  
 
Subsequent increments of long-established repressive legislation 
Kazakhstan's policies that currently administer and repress denominations of Islam and other 
religions seem to “reflect a deep anxiety that [religion] could become a powerful force opposing 
Soviet-style secularism and undermining the legitimacy of existing regimes” (Schoeberlein 2009, 
98). This Soviet-anxiety is said to have been enhanced by western Islamophobia (Heathershaw 
and Montgomery 2014; Khalid 2007; Trisko 2005; Knysh 2004). 
 These claims are supported by the fact that the current provisions in the law on religion 
(Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2011A) share features with the laws on “religious cults” 
from the Soviet Union under Stalin (All-Russian Central Executive Committee 1929) in terms of 
compulsory registration of religious groups, clerics, missionaries and censure of religious 
literature (see chapter I).  
Moreover, the summarized amendments appear to be the next incremental step in a 
sequence of continuous reinforcement of long-established legal provisions. Thus, the 
amendments clearly appear to be formed by path dependence. The convictions and fears behind 
this development seem to have remained as well. All of this will be shown by the short 
description of legal history bellow: 
Notably, repressive legal provisions concerning religion have not existed continuously in 
post-Soviet Kazakhstan. There was a short moment of liberalism in state-confessional relations 
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from 1992 till 1997 when the “law on freedom of religion and religious association” (Law of 
Kazakhstan 1992A) was in place. This law on religion adopted many features from the law “On 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” (Law of the USSR 1990) that was 
established under Gorbachev and marked a break with the repressive Soviet past by protecting 
human rights. It still contained articles on registration of religious associations like the laws on 
religious cults, but registration was not mandatory anymore (articles 9 and 10). Concepts and 
explicit restrictions on unregistered missionary activities or religious travelling were omitted 
(e.g. article 15). 
 However, this period of religious freedom ended in 1997, when the state started to 
increasingly control religion in resemblance of the repressive policies in the Soviet Union. This 
was accompanied by gradual legal changes that culminated in the full return of Soviet-like 
repressive laws in 2011. Kazakhstan’s return to previous repressive methods appears to be 
motivated by strong convictions about the necessity of repression of religious associations 
(value-oriented legal action) and by familiarity with Soviet-methods (traditional legal action), 
because it seems not related to the few insignificant acts of religious terrorism that occurred 
nationally (START 2016A). 
 This gradual reintroduction of Soviet-repression started in 2001, when a new 
administrative codex was ratified. It included article 375 that described the evasion of 
registration by religious associations as a violation (Administrative Code 2001).  This was a re-
introduced provision from the Soviet administrative codex of 1966 (Administrative Code 1966). 
It was enforced contradictorily in 2001, because there still were no provisions explicitly 
obligating registration at that time (Podoprigora 2002, 4.2). 
Thereafter followed three attempts to replace the law on religion of 1992.  Two draft-laws 
were halted by Kazakhstan´s Constitutional Council in 2002 and 2009. A third draft-law was 
withdrawn in 2007 by the government, because it wanted to secure the approval for the OSCE 
chairmanship that was given in 2008 (Berg et al. 2008, Human Rights Watch 2008). 
 The advanced draft-laws intended to discriminate and persecute all unregistered religious 
associations. At the same time, it denied registration for associations that were disapproved by 
the Religious Administration (the DUMK, see chapter II). Requirements for the registration of 
missionaries were envisaged as well (Berg et al. 2008, 12; Human Rights Watch 2010). 
 Although these draft-laws were declined twice by the Constitutional Council, other ways 
were found to introduce amendments indirectly. In 2005 President Nazarbayev signed the first 
law “On combating extremism” (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2005A) and various 
amendments to laws on national security (Ibid., 2005B), which “forbade the activities of 
unregistered religious communities and required registration for missionary activities” (Berg et 
al. 2008, 12). 
 From the first of January 2010 till the end of that year the development toward repressive 
legislation was halted somewhat, because Kazakhstan assumed OSCE chairmanship (Corley 
2009; Ibid., 2010). But after that the frequently declined draft-law of 2009 resurfaced again and 
was accepted and ratified in October 2011 as the new law on religion (Law of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan 2011A). The most controversial provision concerned the compulsory re-registration 
of faith-based organizations. They had to be re-registered within a year under stringent new 
criteria or would face closure (Lillis 2012). These criteria concerned enhanced membership 
requirements that called for minimally 50 members to get registered as a local association, 
tightened guidelines for the training of clergy, enhanced compulsory religious censorship, more 
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banns on unregistered religious activity and extra requirements for approval to build or open new 
places of worship (Human Rights Watch 2012). 
These provisions caused amendments to the Criminal Code and Administrative Code. 
Amended violations in the Administrative Code concerned the lack of “a positive assessment by 
a state religious «expert analysis».” Violations in Criminal Coded were amended to include 
“missionary activity without citizenship or without registration (re-registration)” (Corley 2011).  
Consequences of the new legislation showed up soon. A month after the legislation was 
ratified in September 2011, the government was threatened by terrorists who warned to attack if 
the law was not revoked. The government did not react and consequently, in November, the first 
successful attack in Kazakhstan was carried out in Taraz (see chapter I; Rakisheva and Morrison 
2014, 105)14. In 2012, when the provision about re-registration was enforced, hundreds of small 
religious communities were forced to close or to operate underground (Human Rights Watch 
2013). The government ignored all criticism saying that this literally demonstrated the 
inefficiency of the laws, which were stated to make religious activities transparent but instead 
increased in-transparency and brought about violent resistance in the form of terrorism. 
Then, in 2017, the incrementally updated the law on religion of 2011 by the above-
summarized amendments. In conclusion: the amendments of 2017 incremental updated the law 
on religion of 2011, which has reintroduced repressive provisions from the Soviet legislation on 
religious cults of 1929. Thus, the development of the 2011 law is dependent on paths that started 
at least in 1929, yet they were interrupted for a period between 1992 till 1997. At that time 
legislation was in place that could have led Kazakhstan to more enlightened paths of 
development, i.e. to protection instead of repression of freedom of conscience. Unfortunately, 
post-Soviet Kazakhstan rejected this legislation in favour for a Soviet-style repressive law: 
freedom of conscience was not perceived as an intrinsic (positive) value but, on the contrary, 
believed to be a threat (i.e. a negative value) that needed to be repressed. Thus, value-oriented 
legal action endogenously reinforced a path dependent development. This is supported, firstly, by 
the indication that legal action seems not to have been in correlation with significant external 
factors like acts of terrorism (see chapter I). These did not occur until after the law of 2011 was 
introduced. And, secondly, after the attacks in 2011 the government did not recognize the law as 
a mistake but kept reinforcing it until 2017. Thereby, as shown in the previous sub-section, the 
government has continually ignored criticism about the inefficiency of the law on religion. 
Additionally, because Kazakhstan’s government has been familiar with these Soviet-laws for 
nearly a century, it appears that legal actions were also traditional. 
 
C) The Law “On Communication” 
Summary of the main amendments 
The main amendments to the Law “On Communication” (hereafter: the law on communication) 
(Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2004) were the following: 
 
Article 41-1-2: 
                                                 
14  This was followed by violent demonstrations in Zhanaozen in December. It remains unclear if these two events 
were related. 
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• In cases of emergency or in cases that may lead to grave crimes, the agencies engaged in 
crime detection on telecommunication networks have the right to suspend the work of 
networks and means of communication with a following notification of the Prosecutor 
General's Office within twenty-four hours. The list of agencies empowered to enforce this 
article has been expanded to i.a. include the KNB. Cases of emergency include “calls for 
the implementation of extremist and terrorist activities” (Article 41-1). 
 
In order to give the agencies more power, article 36 was enhanced by paragraph 2. 
 
Article 36-2: 
• Subscribers of communication providers are obliged to register additional personal 
information. Communication providers are prohibited from providing services to 
unregistered mobile subscriber units. 
• The law envisages the creation of a unified database of identification codes (IMEI-
codes), which will streamline personal information of subscribers with mobile devices. 
• Import, production, distribution and operation of mobile subscriber units with modified 
codes or other encryption tools and equipment is prohibited. 
 
The relation to the attacks and nationwide protests 
Article 41-1-2 targets specific criminals executing or planning to execute grave crimes. Because 
acts of terrorism and amok runs are such crimes, this amendment corresponds broadly to features 
of the incidents in Almaty and Aktobe. 
 Meanwhile, paragraph 36-2 does not target a specific group of people or individuals of 
which it wants to control the communication. Instead, the paragraph seems to target all 
subscribers of Kazakhstani communication providers. Thereby, the law explicitly forbids 
encryption tools (OSCE/ODIHR 2016). This empowers the agencies that enforce article 41-1-2 
to monitor and block the communication of a large part of the population. Such measures seem 
useful to hinder or prevent mass gatherings like demonstrations and protests. 
 Notably, a shut-down of communication services was already possible before the 
amendments of 2017, for example, during the violent protests in Zhanaozen (see Chapter II; 
Anceshi 2015). Moreover, Freedom House reported that “social media and communications apps 
have been cut off [...] during the widespread land reform protests” (Freedom House 2015-2016). 
 Notably, such measures might also be useful to prevent acts of terrorism. The 
amendments resemble international surveillance laws that authoritarians use to covertly contain 
political dissent (Ozan 2015, 1710). This is supported by comments to the first draft of the 
amendments, released by the working group, that show that the measures were a product of legal 
diffusion. Article 36-2 is commented to be adapted from legislation in Kyrgyzstan, Turkey, 
Azerbaijan and the Ukraine (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2016B). Yet, similar legislation 
is also present in Germany (The Local 2016) and the USA (compare the Patriot Act). Also, this 
indicates that the amendments might not be designed to be event-specific, but instead be merely 
part of a global trend of adopting surveillance laws to counter terrorism (see Chapter I; Pokalova 
2015). 
 However it may be, articles 41-1-2 and 36-2 appear to be in some general correspondence 
with the features of the nationwide protests and the two attacks. This supports the argument that 
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the amendments were caused by and created to some degree in response to their proclaimed 
causes. 
  
Subsequent increments of long-established repressive legislation 
The first law on communication was introduced in 1999 and replaced by a second law with the 
same name in 2004. This law is still in force today (10.2017). The content of all versions of these 
laws bore witness to a high degree of surveillance and censorship over media and 
communication, which was enforced to contain political dissent in the media (Anceschi 2015, 
287; Deibert 2010, 183-190). In 2007 or earlier the government started to close websites (Deibert 
2010, 188).  The shutting down of social media developed later, at least during and after the 
protests in Zhanaozen in 2011. This implies the government retained the Soviet-practice of 
controlling media but has adapted to technically changed media and communication 
environments. 
 Until 2008, repression seems to have focused mostly on individuals (Anceschi 2015, 
287). An article of criminal law, frequently employed for these purposes (until today), was article 
174 on incitement of hatred and discord (see chapter II). Having been relatively discrete in its 
repression previously, the government became more visibly repressive after around 2008 
(Anceschi 2015, 287; Deibert 2010, 188). One important external reason for this development 
was the oppositional activity of Rakhat Aliev (son-in-law of president Nazarbayev who died in 
2015). To silence him and his followers, the government increasingly closed websites containing 
forms of political dissent. In 2009, the law on communication was amended to equate all internet 
resources with traditional media outlets and to expand “the list of justifications for suspending 
the production and distribution” of these media outlets (Deibert 2010, 186; OSCE 2009B). 
Additionally, probably in imitation of similar laws in Russia, repressive anti-defamation 
measures were introduced, typically used by authoritarians to contain political dissent (Ozan 
2015, 1685). The measures expanded criminal liability for defamation and insult to include all 
internet users in Kazakhstan (Human Rights Watch 2009A). The same repressive measures are 
still being enforced today (Adil soz 2017). 
In 2011 repressive policies increasingly targeted social media due to another external 
factor (Anceschi 2015, 289; Freedom House 2011-2012). This was prompted by the violent 
demonstrations that escalated in the city of Zhanaozen at the 16th-17th of December 2011. 
Immediately after the brutal repression of the protesters, the government isolated Zhanaozen and 
its surroundings by making Twitter, YouTube, and other websites inaccessible (Anceschi 2015, 
290) even though there were no laws that fully legalized such an action. Post factum, in 2012, the 
parliament adopted amendments to the Law “On National Security” (hereafter: the law on 
national security), which let the government block websites and suspend communications 
services during counter-terrorist operations and mass disorder (Article 23-4 in Law of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan 2012). 
In April 2014, the governments legal powers to restrict social media were increased again 
due to external factors. Article 41 developed post-factum as a reaction to three events in 2014. 
Firstly, a false message on WhatsApp went viral announcing the collapse of a bank. Residents of 
Almaty and Astana massively withdrew their savings. Secondly, a protest was held in February 
2014, at which multiple bloggers were arrested. Thirdly, in November a video was published 
showing Kazakhstani children being trained by IS (Lillis 2014). Consequently, article 41-1 was 
introduced in the law on communication as an omni-tool to target a very broad conception of 
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political dissent ranging from rumours to protests to terrorism (Anceshi 2015, 294; Recknagel 
2014; Sodiqov 2014). The article is still in force today (10.2017) and confers the Attorney 
General or his deputies with extrajudicial power to temporarily suspend the operation of 
networks and communication facilities, including (e.g.) WhatsApp and Skype. Suspension is 
permitted when means of communication are used for criminal purposes, for the dissemination of 
information that violates legislation on elections, for calls for extremist and terrorist activities, 
riots and for participation in demonstrations that violate the legal procedures (Tengrinews 2014). 
Article 41-1 forms the basis of the amendments of 2017 summarized above. 
Notably, only in January 2015 the bank run of 2014 seems to have received full attention. 
A new criminal code came into effect in 2015, which included a new article (article 274) 
punishing the spreading of undefined “false information” with up to ten years in prison. The 
article can be interpreted broadly to make “any person be held liable” (Mijatović 2017). 
In 2016 freedom of expression continued to decline (Freedom House 2015 — 2016). 
Users complained that the “authorities blocked access to entire content hosting platforms, 
including Tumblr and Sound Cloud” (Ibid.). During the nationwide protests in April 2016 this 
was especially notable, when various social media and websites were blocked. After these 
protests and the attacks in Aktobe and Almaty, the amendments of 2017 were introduced, which 
expanded article 41 by letting it be enforced by the KNB and enlarged the scope of the measure 
by adding article 36-2 (see summary above). 
 In conclusion: the amendments of 2017 build on a tradition of repressive practice that 
started to be increasingly legalized since 2007 or earlier. This legal development of repressive 
tactics grew in reaction to a media landscape that changed through new communication-
technologies. This was noticeable, because measures were first put into practice in reaction to 
external events and were only afterwards fully legalized: right after communication on social 
media was blocked during the violent protests in Zhanaozen in 2011, the first provisions to block 
social media were introduced in 2012. In 2014 similar measures (article 41) were added to the 
law on communication after a bank-run, a protest and IS propaganda on You-Tube occurred. In 
2017 resembling measures were expanded again after nation-wide protests and acts of terrorism 
occurred. Thus, the amendments and their previous legal provisions were exogenously reinforced 
but do also reflect some path dependent development. This development is at least 5 years old 
(since 2012). It concerns the reinforcement of essentially the same provisions that allow the 
government to block social media. Note, that this path dependency might also be reinforced 
reciprocally in following a global trend of counterterrorism that incites to adopt international 
surveillance laws (see Chapter I; Pokalova 2015). It is hard to unambiguously interpret the legal 
action behind these developments. On the one hand, legal action seems to be instrumental (i.e. 
based on costs and benefits) because the amendments were generally addressing the features of 
external events. Also, Kazakhstan's government replicated the laws from other countries, which 
is less costly and more legitimate than designing them itself (Rudbeck and Mukherjee 2016, 
150). Moreover, it seems beneficent to legalize practices of repression in order to increase 
legitimacy (von Soest and Grauvogel 2015). But legal action might also have been traditional, 
because the provisions indicate path dependent development for 5 years. Additionally, legal 
action might have followed a path dependent global trend concerning counterterrorism (Pokalova 
2015). 
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D) The law “On State Control over the Circulation of Certain Types of Weapons” 
Summary of the amendments 
The amendments to the law “On State Control over the Circulation of Certain Types of 
Weapons” (hereafter: the law on circulation of weapons) (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
1989) are complemented in the laws “On Counteracting Terrorism” (Ibid. 1999) and “On 
Security Operations” (Ibid. 2000), which will not be treated separately here. The main 
amendments were the following: 
 
• Surveillance-measures for facilities in the risk group as well as examination-measures on 
registration and the condition of weapons are enhanced and expanded. 
• Administrative obligations for owners of terrorism-prone facilities or security companies 
protecting these facilities are expanded and enhanced. These include (1) heightened fines 
for leaving terrorism-prone facilities inadequately protected and (2) heightened fines for 
the inadequate opening and functioning of shooting galleries and weapon depots. 
• Restrictions, administrative obligations, heightened fines and extra warnings for 
violations concerning owning, dispersing or carrying of weapons are established. These 
include (1) new exams testing the knowledge of rules on handling weapons; (2) clearer 
rules on re-registration of weapons that are malfunctioning or of which the permits have 
expired or of which the owners have passed away; (3) rules on locations where it is 
allowed to sell weapons; (4) new prohibitions for displaying weapons that are ready for 
use. 
• Heightened fines are established for illegal possession and use of uniforms for employees 
of private security companies. 
 
Human rights protection related to the attacks in Aktobe 
These legal measures are not considered to be repressive, i.e. they are not restricting human 
rights but instead protecting them. The OSCE has not commented on these laws. The laws 
certainly aim at reducing terrorism, violent extremism as well as organized crime, because they 
simply restrict the access to weapons and increase the security of facilities that have proven to be 
vulnerable for terrorism, such as weapon-shops. 
 There is a strong link between these amendments and the attack in Almaty. The 
perpetrator used a weapon to shoot people. Consequently, these legal measures make it harder for 
such perpetrators to illegally obtain weapons. There also is a strong link between amendments 
and the terroristic attack in Aktobe. First of all, the attackers in Aktobe robbed two weapon-shops 
and used their equipment to attack a military outpost. As a consequence, new specific measures 
were introduced that explicitly forbade the display of weapons that are ready for use – before 
2017 no such measures were in place (!) (article 22-4-3; Article 27-3). Secondly, the attackers 
stored weapons at home or in other places. Thus, for the first time a law was introduced in 
Kazakhstan that forbade persons, that are allowed to sell weapons, to store their weapons at other 
places (e.g. at home or at an airport) than the official places assigned for (e.g. weapon-shops or 
police offices) (article 22-4-2). 
 In conclusion: these are clear-cut and efficient measures, many of which are wholly new, 
that have a clear link to specific features of the attack in Almaty and the terrorist attack in 
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Aktobe. The measures are dependent on some previous provisions but seem not on long-
established provisions, i.e. they appear not to be path dependent. Moreover, they do not infringe 
on any human rights but protect them. The amendments seem mostly to be the result of 
instrumental legal action (cost-benefit considerations).  
 
CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION 
Two competing hypotheses were investigated (see methodology), stating that the amendments of 
2017 represent legislation: 
 
(1) that is made by rational decision-making (rational-choice theory), i.e. specifically tuned 
to the events that caused the amendments, independently of previous legislation. 
(2) that is made by path dependence (historical institutionalism), i.e. it has incrementally 
reinforced long-established repressive legislation, with no relation to the events that 
caused the amendments. 
 
This was investigated in chapter III A concerning the law on migration, chapter III B concerning 
the law on religion, chapter III C concerning the law on communication and chapter III D 
concerning the law on the circulation of weapons. 
 
The law on migration and the law on religion  
Chapter III A concluded, firstly, that the amendments to the law on migration were subsequent 
increments of long-established repressive legislation. This means that they were path dependent: 
the amendments of 2017 re-introduced a concept of temporary registration that was already 
present in post-Soviet Kazakhstan’s legislation since independence and before that in Soviet-
legislation. Temporary registration was an essential provision of the old propiska-institution of 
the 1930ies in the Soviet Union, which in turn was re-introduced from similar provisions in the 
Russian Empire. So, this type of registration-institution dates back a century or longer 
(Tukmadiyeva 2015, 1-3; Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR 1974). Secondly, 
the development of the amended law has been continuously reinforced by endogenous 
mechanisms. Meaning, that convictions about the registration measures (value-oriented legal 
actions) and familiarity with these measures (traditional legal actions) blocked alternative 
amendments (for the used terms see Chapter I; Meierheinrich 2016), eventhough many critics 
have continuously warned law-makers about the serious disadvantages and outdatedness of these 
measures (Zhovtis 2017; Ibid. 2016; Tukmadieva 2015; OSCE 2016; Ibid. 2009).    
Concerning the laws on religion in 2017 the analysis in chapter III B concluded, firstly, 
that the amendments were subsequent increments of long-established repressive legislation (thus 
path dependent). This path dependency was driven by endogenous mechanisms of reinforcement, 
namely long-lasting Soviet-convictions about the negative value of Islam for a secular society 
(value-oriented legal actions) and by the familiarity with repressive legislation from the Soviet 
Union (traditional legal actions) (Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014; Schoeberlein 2009; 
Khalid 2007; Trisko 2005; Knysh 2004): Kazakhstan's government was not convinced by the 
intrinsic value of freedom of conscience that the democratic laws on religion were protecting 
between 1990 and 1997 (Law of the USSR 1990; Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan1992A). 
Instead, it favoured Soviet values and traditions of repressive-control. As a consequence, the 
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democratic features of the law were gradually compensated with repressive measures from the 
Soviet legislation on “religious cults” (see chapter I; Podoprigora 2002, 4.1). In 2011, the 
democratic law was wholly substituted by a new law that reintroduced many features of the 
repressive resolution on religious associations of 1929 (All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee 1929). Secondly, the analysis concluded that the latest amendments to the law on 
religion in 2017 were not significantly influenced by external factors as can be inferred from the 
lack of correspondence between the amendments and the specific features of the attacks in 
Aktobe. 
 Thus, until now, the conclusions of both chapter III A and B clearly support the 
hypothesis that path dependence determined the formation of the amendments. Also, it was 
concluded, that this development was driven by endogenous mechanism of reinforcement. 
Although I think the former conclusion is solid, the latter can be nuanced by further research 
arguing for exogenous mechanisms of reinforcement. From a regional perspective, Lain (2016) 
and Omelicheva (2010) showed, that all post-Soviet Central Asian countries including Russia 
repeatedly copied legal provisions from one-another. Thus, it is expected that these countries 
mutually reinforced each other’s legislation. This is supported by Tukmadieva (2015) who 
showed that the mentioned countries all share essentially the same institutions of registration (see 
chapter II; Tukmadieva 2015, 36). The same holds true for the regional presence of religious 
administrations and regionally similar repressive policies on religion (see chapter II; Khalid 
2007). Consequently, the resulting path dependent development of the amendments could be a 
mix between exogenous and reciprocal mechanisms of reinforcement (Gerschewski 2013). 
 Additionally, specifically concerning the conclusions to the law on religion, the decision 
to backtrack to Soviet repressive laws on religion after 1997 might well have been externally 
reinforced by the threat of the civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 till 1997, where Islamists were 
involved. Later, in 1998, these same Islamists established the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU). They executed serious acts of terrorism in neighbouring Uzbekistan and launched a series 
of raids into the south of neighbouring Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000. In 2001 they were largely 
subdued (Green 2016; START 2015)15. Other regional threats concern the ongoing wars by the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. 
 Furthermore, Kazakhstan has shown a concern for fighters returning from IS in the 
amended laws “On Citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan” and “On the legal status of 
foreigners” (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1991; Ibid. 1995B), which are outside the scope 
of this thesis. Article 21 in the law on citizenship (1991) was supplemented with subparagraph 8, 
which states that citizenship of the Republic of Kazakhstan is lost “as a result of a person's 
participation in foreign armed conflicts, extremist and (or) terrorist activities in the territory of a 
foreign state” (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 1991). Also, article 28 in the law on the legal 
status of foreigners (Ibid. 1995B) was changed to enable a stricter regime on the expulsion of 
foreigners or stateless persons. When ex-pulsed, these persons are to be escorted to the borders of 
Kazakhstan under compulsion and are prohibited to enter the country for 5 years (Criminal Code 
2015, article 51-1). Note, that these amendments still merely expand provisions that have been 
enforced since independence. Human rights activists have reported about such expulsions 
                                                 
15 From then on, most fighters of the IMU left Central Asia alone and continued fighting in Pakistan, Afghanistan 
and in Syria, as part of IS in 2015 (Green 2016). IMU’s loyalty was seen as betrayal by the Taliban, which led to 
the liquidation of the IMU in Afghanistan by the Taliban in 201 (Zen 2016). 
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especially in relation to religious freedom. Many of the ex-pulsed foreigners were missionaries, 
priests, theologians (Berg et al. 2008; Mushfig 2011). More recently, these laws were also used 
to strip the citizenship of religious members of Kazakhstan's returning diaspora (Oralmans). Law 
enforcement agencies frequently denoted the Oralmans as religious-extremists and then ex-
pulsed them. Maybe this is because many of the immigrated Oralmans have taken part in the 
violent protests of Zhanaozen (Tojken 2017; Satpayev and Umbetaliyeva 2015, 125). This may 
have led to Kazakhstan denoting their own diaspora as another sort of external threat. This would 
imply an exogenous mechanism of reinforcement of the amendments. 
 
The law on communication 
Concerning the conclusions of the analysis of the law on communication in chapter III C. Firstly, 
it concluded mostly in favour of the hypothesis that the amendments were event-specific and 
corresponded to the features of the terrorist attacks and the nationwide protests: article 41-1-2 
targeted specifically grave crimes like terrorism and article 36-2 is expected to be applied to 
hinder mass assemblies, because the government already used such measures to block social-
media before, e.g. during the nation-wide protests. This relative newness and event-specificity 
indicate aspects of instrumental legal action (cost-benefit considerations). Secondly, chapter IIIC 
concluded that, although the amendments were relative new, they also depended on short-term 
subsequent increments of previous repressive legislation: the amendments of 2017 reinforced 
essentially the same legal provisions for at least 5 years, since 2012. Thereby, this development 
was exogenously reinforced. Article 41 in 2017 and its prior version in 2014 as well as similar 
provisions in and before 2012 were all generally addressing the features of external events: 
article 41 was introduced in 2014 as a reaction to the external incidents (political dissent like 
protests, terroristic propaganda and a single bank-run). In 2012 provisions to block 
communications, websites and social media were introduced after the protests in Zhanaozen 
(2011). Because the amendments did show short-time path dependence, this indicates also 
traditional legal action, i.e. the law-makers were accustomed to repeatedly reinforce such 
legislation, although essentially nothing new was provided for. Thirdly, the amendments appear 
to have adopted some sort of international surveillance laws (Ozan 2015, 1710). The provisions 
resemble legislation in Germany, the USA (patriot act), Turkey, the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
Kyrgyzstan (The Local 2016; Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2016B). Therefore, both 
amended articles may be following a global trend of adopting surveillance laws to counter 
terrorism (see Chapter I; Pokalova 2015). Thus, on the one hand, legal action can be understood 
as instrumental (i.e. based on cost-benefit considerations), because when legislation is replicated 
from other countries, this is less costly than designing it by itself. Also, the adoption of 
international laws might increase their legitimacy, which is beneficent (Rudbeck and Mukherjee 
2016, 150). Yet, this global trend has been indicated to develop by path dependence (Pokalova 
2015), which indicates that non-instrumental legal actions might be at play as well. 
 A law that is similar to the law on communication concerns the Law “On Counteracting 
the Legalization (Laundering) of Proceeds from Crime and Financing of Terrorism” (Law of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan 2009). Because it was only marginally amended in 2017, it was left 
outside the scope of this thesis. Just like the law on communication this law adopted international 
counterterrorism provisions and appears to belong to the same global trend in countering 
terrorism by surveillance (Pokalova 2015). Notably, this law incorporated international 
surveillance measures that are partly in line with UN regulations (OSCE 2016) and appear to 
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have been successful in countering terrorism16. Note that, simultaneously, these measures are 
enforced repressively to block the bank accounts of activists and oppositional figures without 
any due legal process by accusing them of financing broadly defined “extremism” (see chapter 
II) (article 12-1) (Corley 2017C; Ibid. 2016). In that way the law has been used against 
participants of the nation-wide protests (Glushkova 2017). Future studies are expected to find 
more ways in which this law is used repressively, probably comparable to Russia’s Financial 
Monitoring Service (see chapter I; Varol 2015, 1712). Just like the law on communication, it is 
hard to give an unambiguous interpretation of the legal actions that formed this law, because 
contradicting types of legal action seem to apply simultaneously. 
  
The law on the circulation of weapons 
Chapter III D analysed the amendments to the law “on state control over the circulation of 
certain types of weapons”. Conclusions were in full support of the hypothesis that the 
amendments were event-specific: the amendments did significantly correspond with the features 
of the attacks in Almaty and Aktobe but not with the nation-wide protests. The amendments 
restricted access to weapons, which were used in both attacks in Almaty and Aktobe. The 
amendments increased the security of vulnerable facilities such as weapon-shops, which truly 
were attacked by terrorists in Aktobe in 2016 and in Taraz in 2011. Some of these measures were 
shown to be wholly new and crucial. For the first time it was, for example, explicitly forbidden 
to display weapons that are ready for use or to store weapons at home or other inconvenient 
places. The amendments were the result of instrumental legal action (cost-benefit 
considerations), because they were new17 , event-specific and not significantly dependent on 
previous legislation. Unlike the other amendments, these amendments were not repressive: they 
did not infringe on any human rights but aimed at protecting them. 
 
Discussion of the final conclusions 
Concerning the amendments of 2017 as a whole, the analysis of chapter III, firstly, supported 
mostly the hypothesis stating that the amendments were path dependent, because they consisted 
largely of subsequent increments of long-established and essentially unchanged repressive 
legislation. The laws on communication appeared a partial exception and the law on the 
circulation of weapons a full exception to the hypothesis. Secondly, the analysis of chapter III 
has least supported the hypothesis that the amendments of 2017 were developed as a specific 
reaction to the two terrorist attacks in Aktobe and Almaty and the nation-wide protests in 2016. 
Only the law on the circulation of weapons applies fully to this hypothesis. 
 Notably, except for the law on the circulation of weapons, the amendments of 2017 have 
ignored the features of the attack in Almaty. This attack was wrongly determined as terroristic, 
because it was rather an amok-run in revenge for imprisonment (see chapter II). Measures that 
would have been suited to prevent such amok-runs would be improving the abominable prisons 
                                                 
16 Kairat Umarov, Kazakhstan's permanent representative to the United Nations, is heading the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-
Qaida Sanctions Committee of the UN Security council (UN Department of Public Information 2017). 
17 This can be nuanced a bit, because there are indications that some of the amendments may come from similar 
provisions in Russia. This would again highlight the regional dimension that this thesis did not significantly 
analyse (Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan 2016B). 
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and re-socialization programs in Kazakhstan18. Such content was not found in the amendments of 
2017. 
 On the whole this thesis questions the idea that repressive measures are taken by rational-
choice or cost-benefit considerations. It was shown that especially the laws on migration and 
religion were mostly reinforced by traditional and value-oriented legal action, which is not 
rational; meaning that some cost-benefit considerations might only marginally have been applied 
for this value- and tradition-driven reinforcement of long-established repressive legislation. In 
addition to this, the thesis concluded that the reinforcing mechanisms behind the developments 
of the law on migration and the law on religion were mostly endogenous. From a regional 
perspective, it is expected that further analysis will find significant mechanisms of exogenous 
(e.g. regional triggers like the civil war in Tajikistan and the attacks of terrorism in Uzbekistan) 
and reciprocal reinforcement (e.g. the mutual adaptation of laws by the Central Asian states 
including Russia). 
 Further research to uncover the drives behind the development of repressive laws is 
necessary to better understand the repressive functioning of authoritarian governments like 
Kazakhstan. If Kazakhstan’s repressive policies are to be reduced and its human rights situation 
is to be bettered, it is necessary for human rights activists and peace builders to understand the 
governments fears and needs behind its repressive behaviour. At present it looks like path 
dependent reinforcement of repressive laws is continuing, which is predicted by some scholars to 
lead to increased social unrest and eventually to resistance, e.g. acts of terrorism, in the future 
(Lenz-Raymann 2014). This is all the more expected because new amendments to increase 
repressive provisions in the law on religion (2011) are being designed: if adopted these 
amendments will require “re-registration of almost all religious communities, and impose new 
restrictions on and punishments for religious education, sharing beliefs, censorship of literature 
and (for state officials) participating in worship” (Corley 2017A). Thereby, only the DUMK and 
the nationwide Russian Orthodox organisation are exempted form re-registration. Note, that in 
2011 such measures were followed by a serious act of terrorism in Taraz. Strikingly, Kazakh 
authorities sought no legal reviews of their amendments from the OSCE or the Council of 
Europe's Venice Commission 19 , implying that Kazakhstan is now refusing any alternative 
perspectives on matters of religious freedom and counterterrorism (Ibid.). 
 
CHAPTER V: FINAL CONCLUSION 
The amendments of 2017 consist mostly of subsequent increments of long-established repressive 
legislation and are only to a minor degree developed newly to specifically address the terrorist 
attacks in Aktobe and Almaty. The nationwide protests are only minimally accounted for in the 
amendments. The features of the attack in Almaty seems mostly ignored. Rather than using 
rational-choice a significant part of the amendments reinforces old repressive laws and practices 
from the Soviet Union based on strong convictions and familiarity with Soviet laws and policies. 
 
                                                 
18 On the other hand, Nazarbayev did sign a new national policy to improve re-socialization programs 
(Kudajbergenov 2016). 
19 Kazakhstan is both an OSCE participating State and a Venice Commission member state (Corley 2017A). 
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